Andrew Strom is the Legal and Policy Director for the American Guild of Musical Artists (AGMA), and has been contributing to OnLabor since 2014. The views he expresses on this blog are his personal opinions and should not be attributed to AGMA.
When union organizers give a “know your rights” presentation to workers, occasionally a worker who is anticipating a confrontation with a supervisor will ask, “Can you show me where the law says that?” This presents a problem because in most cases the relevant statute, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), does not address the specific questions that are likely to arise during a union organizing drive. Instead, the answers to questions like, “Do I have a right to talk about the union at work?” are found in the tens of thousands of cases that the National Labor Relations Board has decided since 1935. Recent Supreme Court decisions have undermined this system of making labor policy through adjudication at the NLRB. I have previously made the case that the existing system must be revamped going forward, but it’s also doubtful that we can count on courts to enforce existing rules that are the product of NLRB case law. As Brian Petruska suggested earlier this year, part of the solution is to codify the many rules that give meaning to the right to organize, collectively bargain, and engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. I don’t know if this is an “impossible task,” but it’s easier said than done.
The Supreme Court once recognized that in enacting the NLRA, Congress “entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, … equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience.” This meant that decisions would be “made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject.” The Roberts Court has embarked on a project to undermine the legitimacy of administrative agencies. The current right-wing majority refuses to acknowledge that the work of filling in the details of legislation written in broad strokes often involves making policy decisions. Instead, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the majority made the preposterous assertion that “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do – in fact, must – have a single, best meaning.” Even though in Loper Bright itself the Court acknowledged that the best reading of a statute might be that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, several circuit courts have taken Loper Bright as a license to give no deference to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA. The Court followed Loper Bright with Trump v. Slaughter, where it described the heads of agencies as merely the President’s “assistants,” who are “subject to his superintendence.” While it’s perfectly reasonable for a President’s assistants to make policy, it makes no sense for one group of Presidential assistants to adjudicate cases where one party is another Presidential assistant – the NLRB’s General Counsel.
So, while the substantive provisions of the NLRA remain intact, courts can’t be counted on to enforce rules that have been developed by the NLRB through adjudication, and going forward it is unclear if any entity will have the authority and legitimacy to take Section 7 of the NLRA, which gives workers the right to organize, collectively bargain, and engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection and make policy decisions about matters such as workers’ right to use their employer’s property to carry out those activities. One solution would be to enact a much more detailed version of the NLRA that codifies rules that have been developed through case law, and in some cases improves those rules. But, this is a herculean challenge.
Here’s how the statute might codify the existing right to talk about unions to the same extent workers may discuss other topics, while fixing the artificial distinction between talking and “soliciting.” The statute could provide that “if employees are allowed to talk to each other about any issue other than the immediate task at hand while they are working, then they have the right to talk to each other about unionization, and this includes asking a co-worker to join a union, attend a union meeting, or vote for a union in a representational election.” It’s worth noting that Section 7 currently uses only 42 words to set forth the rights the statute protects (plus some additional words guaranteeing the right to refrain from exercising those rights), while I have used 58 words just to address a single question that arises under that provision. Codifying rules developed through case law would add hundreds of pages to the NLRA.
Each attempt at codification would also re-ignite debates about whether or not to impose bright line rules. I’d add a provision stating that “no employer shall directly, or indirectly, ask an employee about their views regarding unionization, or about the union activities of any employee, nor shall any employer make paraphernalia available to employees, such as ‘vote no’ pins, that have the effect of indicating the employee’s views on unionization.” This would replace current case law, which applies a multi-factor test to determine when an employer’s interrogation of an employee is coercive, and which prohibits employers from handing workers anti-union paraphernalia but allows them to place the same items in bins and later observe if the workers are wearing them.
One challenge in codifying rights in this way is that the factors used in the case law often do not easily translate into statutory language. Take the current rule on employer surveillance of union activity. Employers may not engage in surveillance of union activity, but an employer may casually observe open union activity. The casual observation becomes unlawful if the employer does something “out of the ordinary” to monitor the activity. Practitioners are so used to this test that we don’t give it a second thought. Dozens of cases have given meaning to this term, and cases often turn on how long a supervisor lingers to observe the activity. Is there a straightforward way for the statute to capture the notion that surveillance of open union activity is illegal when the employer does something “out of the ordinary” to observe it?
Codifying the duty to provide information, which has long been implied from the duty to bargain, would raise many questions. Would it be sufficient to say that information must be provided “as soon as practicable?” And what should the statute say about the effort an employer must make to obtain information in the hands of its contractors or other third parties? How much justification does a union need to provide to obtain non-bargaining unit information? When should an employer have to share information about its finances? And where there is a legitimate basis for confidentiality, when does a proposed confidentiality agreement overreach?
Since 1977, labor law reform has been the great white whale for unions. While I’m prone to pessimism, the Supreme Court has really forced the issue with Trump v. Slaughter. A statutory fix is now a necessity. And while the model of a statute written in broad outlines, with details to be filled in by an administrative agency might be more sensible, we have to play the hand we have been dealt. If we want to pass a law that truly protects the right to organize and bargain collectively, that law must include a lot more detail about what those rights mean.
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November 19
Harvard academic workers end strike without contract; Reuters journalists authorize a strike; Spirit Airlines’ sale of employee data to Google for AI training approved.
November 18
Judge vacates foreign-student visa limits; DOL proposes QPAM relief; Supreme Court declines Nexstar appeal.
November 17
Amazon workers in Canada win company's first union contract in North America; NY law gives employees access to personnel records; D.C. Circuit looks to overturn Trump joint employer rule
November 16
FMCSA ordered to disburse $73 million in withheld highway funds to New York; Department of Labor final rule regarding large union financial disclosures issued six years after initial withdrawal is upheld; Department of Labor issues enforcement alert for physician ghost networks maintained by health plans.
November 15
Unions oppose Chuck Schumer for Senate Majority Leader; Rockstar staff vote on unionization ahead of Grand Theft Auto VI’s release; New Jersey Education Association faces federal investigation.
November 12
Harvard graduate students go on strike; New York city mayor prepares to negotiate with the city's largest public union; the Trump administration proposes stringent rules for workers seeking benefits.