This is the final post in a three-part series on Ruelas v. County of Alameda, in which the California Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees are not guaranteed a minimum wage. You can find Part 1 here and Part 2 here.

In Ruelas v. County of Alameda, the Supreme Court of California denied pretrial detainees’ state minimum wage claim, reasoning that section 4019.3 of the state’s Penal Code — capping jail laborers’ wages at two dollars per day — instead governed.  The first part of this three-part series discussed the California Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning.  The second part gave a history of California’s constitution and jail labor in the state, concluding that the two-dollar daily wage cap could not have applied to plaintiffs, who were pretrial detainees performing unpaid labor for a corporation.  This final part argues that the legislative history supports this claim. It concludes that the California Supreme Court could — and should — have decided this case differently, giving plaintiffs the chance to recover state minimum wages for their labor. 

Legislative History of Section 4019.3 

According to the California Code of Civil Procedure section 1859, “[i]n the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature . . . is to be pursued, if possible.”  Further, “[t]he words of a statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.”  Nothing in the statutory context or legislative history suggests that section 4019.3’s wage cap applied to pretrial detainees laboring for a corporation. 

The California legislature had not contemplated the possibility that section 4019.3’s cap on jail inmates’ wages could apply to pretrial detainees laboring for a corporation, and the statute should be read more narrowly with such legislative context in mind.  When the California legislature enacted Penal Code section 4019.3 in 1959 and then amended the statute in 1975, California’s constitution banned private contracting for inmate labor.  The legislative history of the act supports this understanding.  In 1957, the California Attorney General wrote to the Governor of California, stating that he found “no substantial legal objection” to the bill.  It passed without attention in 1959.  In 1975, the legislature moved to amend the law to increase the minimum wage permitted for county jail inmates from fifty cents to two dollars per day; it was “supported by law enforcement groups and [had] no opposition.”   The bill also received the support of the California Probation, Parole, and Correctional Association.   Legislative counsel to the Governor reviewed the assembly bill and, without performing any extensive review, suggested that it would be constitutional.  Thus, there was no perceived conflict with the state constitution’s ban on private contracting for inmate labor. 

Furthermore, legislative history suggests that the legislature passed the bill to compensate county jail detainees for their labor in the public, not private, sector.  The Sheriff of San Diego County wrote Assembly member Julian Dixon in support of the bill.  He stated, “[e]nactment of AB 1396 would allow a Board of Supervisors to more adequately compensate county jail trusties for their work performed at considerable savings to the taxpayers.”  The sheriff’s letter in support of the bill, therefore, stated that the work being performed in the county jails saved the taxpayers money, suggesting that the work detainees performed was at least largely public (that is, conserving taxpayer dollars), rather than private, in nature.  Furthermore, in statements to the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee, Assemblyman William Craven — the bill’s chief sponsor — stated that part of the bill’s purpose was to “provide parity in pay credits to persons confined in county institutions” as compared with “[i]nmates in honor camps.”  In San Diego County, represented by Assemblymen Craven, “[h]onor [c]amps” employed inmates in public works. Thus, the bill was conceived to bring “inmate[s] in [] County Jail[s]” who were “perform[ing work] at considerable savings to the taxpayers” to parity with those laboring in public works outside of these institutions.  In other words, the 1975 amendment was meant to bring pay equity to county inmates laboring on public works, whether they were confined in or outside of a county jail. 

The Ruelas court’s primary argument for a more expansive reading of section 4019.3 is a 1974 Attorney General opinion stating that section 4019.3 applied to “pre-sentence as well as post-sentence work time.”  Considering the rest of the legislative history, granting significant weight to the Attorney General’s opinion is not warranted.  First, the Attorney General’s statement came after the statute’s original enactment in 1959 and was not reiterated by the legislature in 1975.  Therefore, it is unclear if the legislature itself read the statute to apply so expansively to “pre-sentence” inmates.  In the committee hearings on the bill, there is no suggestion that the Attorney General opinion was accorded any weight (or even considered) by the legislature.^[1]  Second, even if the Attorney General’s analysis accurately reflected the legislature’s understanding, “pre-sentence” does not mean “pretrial.”  Pre-sentencing typically refers to the period before a defendant has been sentenced but after he has been found guilty, whereas pretrial refers to the period during which a defendant is presumed innocent but awaiting trial.  All named plaintiffs in the case worked for Aramark as pretrial detainees or detainees awaiting immigration proceedings, and thus fell into a category not addressed by the Attorney General in 1974.  Therefore, even if the California Supreme Court considered the Attorney General opinion as an authoritative indicator of legislative intent, the Attorney General’s interpretation does not govern the plaintiffs in this case. 

An Alternative Reading

Given the legislative history and context, the California Supreme Court should have interpreted section 4019.3 more narrowly.  If it had done so, pretrial detainees laboring for private corporations could have claimed minimum wages under the state’s Labor Code. The court stated that “[a] county may not simultaneously comply with Penal Code section 4019.3 . . . and . . . comply with the Labor Code.”  However, if section 4019.3 imposes a wage cap only to those inmates employed by public, not private, entities, then both section 4019.3 and the Labor Code’s minimum wage can coexist.  County jail detainees working exclusively for public entities — as the legislature originally conceptualized, and the constitution until 1990 required — may earn up to two dollars per eight hours of work.  But the statutory cap does not extend to pretrial detainees laboring for a corporation.  As discussed, this narrower reading aligns with the historical context and legislative history of the state’s Penal Code and constitution. 

The narrower reading also aligns with a straightforward textual analysis of Proposition 139.  As mentioned, voters understood the proposition as one that repealed the state constitution’s ban on private contracting for prison and jail labor.  The proposition added Article XIV, section 5 to the California Constitution, allowing for the private contracting of inmate labor.  The amendment stated that these programs should be conducted and “implemented pursuant to . . . the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990.”  When the Department of Corrections contracts with joint venture employers, the prisoners are compensated with “comparable [] wages paid . . . to non-inmate employees performing similar work . . . .” The California constitution, though, stated that inmate labor programs “shall be operated and implemented pursuant to . . . the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990, and rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of Corrections and, for county jail programs, by local ordinances.”  Given that no local ordinances govern the labor relationship between Santa Rita Jail inmates and employers like Aramark, nothing forecloses the Labor Code from applying here — just as the district court held.  As a result, plaintiffs should have been eligible for wages under the state’s Labor Code. 

In addition to the state statutory and constitutional interpretation issues raised here, one federal reform would ensure that all pretrial detainees are eligible for wage protections: amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Circuits are split as to whether the FLSA applies to incarcerated workers.  Because the Ninth Circuit construes the FLSA to exclude incarcerated workers, plaintiffs in Ruelas argued that the case should be considered under the state Labor Code, not the FLSA.  However, if Congress were to amend the FLSA to include incarcerated workers, it would preempt consideration of the state labor and Penal Code issues raised here and enable incarcerated workers across the country to receive minimum wages for their labor. 

Conclusion

The California Supreme Court read section 4019.3 too broadly.  It denied pretrial detainees minimum wage protections afforded to non-incarcerated workers and, since 1990, workers incarcerated in state prisons.  In denying pretrial detainees compensation, the California Supreme Court categorically decided a close issue of statutory interpretation to the detriment of presumed innocent civilians.  Had the court more closely considered the legislative and constitutional history surrounding the relevant acts, they would have come to a different conclusion: one that advances fairness and justice for non-convicted, incarcerated individuals who are forced to labor for a corporation. 

^[1] This analysis is based on the author’s review of all available California State Archives materials for the 1959 and 1975 bills.